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The cultural and creative
industries: a review of the literature
A report for Creative Partnerships
Justin O’Connor
School of Performance and Cultural industries
The University of Leeds
Creative Partnerships aims to develop schoolchildren’s potential,
ambition, creativity and imagination. It achieves this by building
sustainable partnerships between schools, creative and cultural
organisations and individuals, which impact on learning. Phase 1 of
the programme ran from April 2002 to March 2004. Sixteen Creative
Partnerships were established in areas of economic and social
disadvantage. Each Creative Partnership brokered partnerships
between 15-25 schools and creative individuals and organisations.
Nine Phase 2 Creative Partnerships areas joined the initiative in
September 2004 and eleven Phase 3 areas were established during
September 2005.
Creative Partnerships aims to influence policy and practice in both
the education and cultural sectors. It was established by Arts Council
England, with funding from the Department for Culture, Media and
Sport (DCMS) and the Department for Children, Schools and
Familes (DCFS) in response to the National Advisory Committee on
Creative and Cultural Education (NACCCE) report by Ken Robinson:
All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education (1999). It
spearheads a raft of initiatives designed to develop creativity and
encompasses social, personal and economic domains. As a flagship
project, Creative Partnerships can have maximum impact if teachers,
parents, children, youth and creative practitioners learn from the
experience and activities that are delivered through the programme.
For this reason one of the most significant legacies of Creative
Partnerships will be the product of its research and evaluation and
how that is effectively communicated to stakeholders. 
However, because Creative Partnerships works by drawing from the
widest fields of endeavour, the stakeholders often recognise that
there is a ‘knowledge gap’ between reflection, analysis and learning
from the programme. In addition, the wide focus of approach – which
is fundamental to the nature of creativity – means that people are
often working at the limit of their disciplines. 
For these reasons we have commissioned a series of research
monographs exploring the key issues in current literature and
summarising the latest developments in each subject. Each
monograph is written by an experienced and respected author or
authors in their field. The reports aim to be accessible, clearly
referenced and to act as ‘stepping-stone’ resources to underpin the
research conducted by and for Creative Partnerships.
This report surveys the literature focusing on the history and theory
of the cultural and creative industries. It explores both the history of
the idea of the cultural industries and how this has changed and
developed our current interest in the creative economy. It focuses on
the conceptual ideas behind thinking in this area and lays out the
reasons behind the shifts in terminology and policy. It is especially
relevant to the broader ambitions for Creative Partnerships for two
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reasons. First as research conducted by Burns Owens Partnerships
in 2006 showed, Creative Partnerships can in some ways claim to be
the largest single investment in artists and the arts sector – in terms
of professional development – ever undertaken in the UK (Burns
Owens Partnerships, 2006). Working with the cultural and creative
sectors is key to Creative Partnerships’ success and ambitions and
this report sheds light on some of the assumptions and aspirations
behind those ambitions. Secondly, CP is substantively interested in
offering a kind of creative education in tune with some of the
speculations about the shift to a creative economy. Again this report
shows the historical and theoretical complexities underlying this
direction. 
We hope that the report will be a useful and practical handbook for
those interested in cultural and creative industries. It offers a serious
and sophisticated review of the concept of the cultural and creative
industries and should be of use to all those with ambitions to act in
this arena. A key part of Creative Partnerships’ future development
will be shaped by an engagement with the challenges Professor
O’Connor clearly lays out here. 
Dr David Parker, Creative Partnerships
Dr Julian Sefton-Green, Creative Partnerships
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This account takes a sixty year trip from ‘The Culture Industry’,
through the ‘cultural industries’, ending at the ‘creative industries’. Its
main theme is the tension between culture and economics which lie
at the heart of this terminology. This is not simply a question of ‘art’
and ‘the market’; this is part of it, but the market in ‘cultural
commodities’ has a long history and ‘artists’ have long been at home
with it. In the last century the production of cultural commodities has
accelerated with the development of technologies of reproduction –
digitalisation following in the treads of Gutenberg; and this production
has become increasingly capitalised. Commodity production is not
the same as capitalism; the former has an ancient history, the latter
began 500 years ago in Europe. Capitalism is animated by the
principle of unlimited accumulation at the expense of all other values.
‘Art’ or ‘culture’ has always been one of the limits on, or protests
against, this principle. But it did so whilst at the same time being a
commodity increasingly subject to the laws of capital.
Section one begins with Adorno who thought that these laws of
industrial capitalism had finally abolished any kind of critical or
authentic culture. In section two we look at those writers in the 1970s
who felt that the cultural appeal of cultural commodities was central to
their economic success and thus could not be rigidly planned or
predicted. People wanted to buy things that genuinely appealed to
them. This new attitude to the cultural industries produced a new kind
of cultural policy, exemplified by the Greater London Council. 
In section three we chart the emergence of new economic discourses
which argued for the end of mass production and a rise in cultural
consumption. This new production foregrounded small businesses,
networks, risk-taking, creativity and constant innovation in a way that
set the cultural industries as exemplars for a new kind of economy
and central to our future economic growth.
In section four we look at how this was reflected in new thinking
about cities and urban economies. Parallel to the rise of cultural
industries was the growing importance of culture for city image and
place making, cultural tourism and urban regeneration. They form
part of the talk of creative cities and creative class which are with us
today.
In section five we look at the creative industries, as launched by the
New Labour government in 1998, suggesting some problems with the
terminology itself and the policy agenda to which it gave rise. At the
end we put forward some thoughts on the connections and
contradictions between cultural and economic policy. 
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1.1 Adorno, modern culture and modernist
aesthetics
Discussions of the cultural industries usually start from Theodor
Adorno, who, with his colleague Max Horkheimer, first coined the
term in 1947 with the essay ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as
Mass Deception’ (chapter 3 in Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979).
Adorno’s subsequent writings - on film, radio, newspapers and (most
notoriously) jazz and popular music – all re-affirmed the message
that under monopoly capitalism art and culture had now become
thoroughly absorbed by the economy (Adorno 1991). 
However, Adorno is not to be equated with those conservative
cultural critics of ‘mass society’ who held the combination of modern
communication technologies, mass democracy and mass industrial
organisation responsible for a universal cultural collapse, with the
European arts tradition as a last refuge from general barbarism. Nor
can he be associated with those who saw modernist art as the last
great incarnation of that tradition, thus to be protected and supported
against the forces of industrialised culture (cf. Greenberg, 1961).
Adorno’s post-war writings on the Culture Industry ran parallel to the
founding of the different national arts and cultural ministries and
foundations across Europe, and indeed to the emergence of a
distinct discourse of cultural policy per se. 
The new Culture Industry sought the surface effects associated with
both popular culture and ‘high art’ - means of attraction and
seduction, of stimulating desire without reflection, providing
distraction at the expense of thought. Glittering novelty masked
endless repetition and endless disappointment. As such the Culture
Industry was a direct extension of the new industries of mass
reproduction and distribution which had begun at the turn of the 19th
century – film, sound recording, mass circulation dailies, popular
prints and later, radio broadcasting. But it also grew out of the art
tradition on whose surface techniques it also drew but whose intrinsic
meaning it abandoned (Adorno, 1981, 1992). It was in this context
that avant-garde modernism began its great aesthetic renunciations,
its retreat into difficult and occult formal procedures. 
The Culture Industry found its full purpose when it became integrated
into the new system of monopoly capitalism, which was predicated
on total control of the masses. Here Adorno equates the American
Culture Industry with European Fascism (Huyssen, 1986). The
modern worker has been completely integrated into the industrial
machine, a controlled automaton he now has his leisure time and his
interiority programmed and controlled by modern industrial
techniques. The Fordist factory system now moved into the realm of
culture used as a powerful ideological tool. The techniques of the
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1  The culture industry as 
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Culture Industry – the use of predictable effects, the controlled
manipulation of audience response, and the endlessly deferred
gratification of stimulated desire – which had been developed under
the pressure of commodification, were now used by monopoly
capitalism itself. The Culture Industry moguls were servants of the
latter – they were answerable to oil, steel and electricity. Like
Goebbels’ subservience to Hitler, the Culture Industry was ultimately
a tool of the ruling class and the State. 
As we shall see there are some real problems with this position, but
before this let us look at certain aspects of this argument and try to
put Adorno’s concerns into some historical perspective. 
1.2 Cultural commodities
1.2.1 Technological reproduction
The ‘industrialisation’ of culture is often associated with modern
technological reproducibility, but in fact the cultural commodity has an
ancient history. Walter Benjamin, a colleague of Adorno, talked about
the ‘aura’ of the art object (and its erosion in contemporary culture)
suggesting its origins in cultic and ritual practices (Benjamin, 1970).
These unique ‘artistic’ products always had great sacred, symbolic
and/or prestige value; but they could also be given or traded for other
objects or services or money. Technological reproduction extended
this commodity market in quite ancient times. Metal casting was an
early form of mass reproduction (including minting coins), and
productivity gains through efficient division of labour could be found
in classical Chinese porcelain production. But it was with the
invention of printing that technological reproducibility became linked
to profound changes in the dynamics of cultural production and
consumption.
Mass reproduction allows the initial investment in materials, skills and
time to be recouped by volume sales of the copies - the cheaper the
copy the more the potential profit. With each new technological
improvement of the printing press the time and effort involved in
reproduction fell (Briggs and Burke, 2005). Along with moveable type
came improvements in wood block printing and then etching,
producing a new market in prints. With photography, copies of
artworks improved still further, and gradually images of the real world
became art objects in their own right. The early 20th century saw the
capture of moving images and the elusive world of sound on wax
discs. At the end of that century, digital technology opened up
possibilities which we are still only beginning to grasp. 
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1.2.2 Commodity production
Technological reproduction is necessary but not sufficient to explain
the expansion of cultural commodity production. In Capital Marx
traces the complex historical process by which a fairly limited sphere
of commodity production (common to all but the most primitive
societies) becomes the dominant form of economic production, and
by which the whole economic and social structure becomes
reconfigured around the need of capital to produce, distribute and
sell commodities at a profit (Marx, 1976). 
In Europe for example, printing arrived in parallel with an emergent
market economy controlled by an increasingly powerful urban
merchant class, part of a wider political context of a fragmented or
‘granular’ power structure where no single State was able to
completely impose its authority, either across the region or within its
own boundaries. Books had been sacred, copied by hand, singular
objects of great value. The printing press changed all this – but how
was the production and distribution of these multiple copies to be
organised? Who paid who, and for what exactly? How did Gutenberg
recoup his money? On what basis was the writer to be paid? What
was ‘intellectual property’ (IP)– a god-given right possessed by all
authors or something bought for a fee by a publisher to do with as he
wished? These were difficult legal questions, at a time when
‘property’ itself was hardly well defined. But it reflected a wider
uncertainty about what such commodities actually were. Did value
reflect the paper and the ink and the time taken to make and set the
presses, or the creative work of the author? If it was the former, then
what about bad books; if the latter, then how exactly was this to be
measured? In the meantime a cultural commodity economy began to
grow by trial and error, wrapped up in different customs, legalities
and practices. Publishers, authors, and booksellers emerged who
knew how to play the system (though of course there were many
that didn’t!). 
1.2.3 Media and communication
The emergence of an extended commodity economy involved
profound cultural transformations, as the fundamental structures of
personal and collective meaning were overturned. Crucially, the very
symbolic means by which these conflicting meanings were
circulated, contested and extrapolated within this changing society
were themselves becoming commodities. Again, this was by no
means a straightforward or uncontested process – indeed, it is the
main subject of this review.
The invention of printing is not primarily seen as epoch-making
because it gave rise to the cultural commodity but because it
radically transformed the sphere of media or communications. It
replaced the age-old domination of the (mostly religious) visual
image by the printed word. The circulation of the sacred text was
restricted by its limited number and the illiteracy of the population
(why learn when there was nothing to read?). The mass reproduction
of books was a direct challenge to established religious and political
authority. The vernacular bible followed by a whole series of scientific
and humanistic tracts took knowledge and information outside of the
carefully regulated sphere of State and religious authority. The mass
reproduction of books was associated with the emergence of new
radical political and religious movements, and ultimately with the
emergence of the modern democratic state. 
Important for us is that though the State and religious authority
constantly strove to regulate it, the new print media were organised
mainly around the market and a new range of private and civic
institutions which grew up with it – newspapers, political and religious
groups (and their presses), scientific and humanistic societies, salons
and coffee houses etc. In short, the print media became the basis of
a new ‘public sphere’ between the State and individual, and made up
of a range of institutions under the control of ‘public opinion’. It was
this public sphere – classically outlined by Habermas (1989), a pupil
of Adorno – which formed the basis for the contestation and
legitimation of political and socio-economic power over the last 250
years. 
Adorno’s Culture Industry was thus not primarily about the
commodification of culture; it was about the organisation of cultural
commodity production on a mass industrial scale. As such the
complex play between art as commodity and as autonomous form
collapsed as the independent artist gave way to the culture factory.
1.3 The autonomy of art
1.3.1 Aesthetics 
The idea of the autonomy of art - couched in terms of its
separateness from the material, instrumental concerns of everyday
life – is frequently attributed to the German writer, Alexander
Baumgarten in the mid-18th century, and especially the great theorist
of the new aesthetics, Immanuel Kant. In short, they attempted to
ground judgements of ‘taste’ – previously associated with purely
personal, subjective preference – on a general theory of perception
in which ‘the beautiful’ became a central, objective category.
Judgement as to what was beautiful rested not therefore on
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individual taste but on an objective viewpoint from which all particular
interests and desires had been purged. Aesthetics concerned
precisely these universal, ‘disinterested’ judgements of taste and
beauty. It has been fairly straightforward for critics to expose this
‘universal’ judgement as merely the taste of a particular class (the
new bourgeoisie), and ‘disinterested’ judgements the precise
mechanism through which this was achieved (Bourdieu, 1986; Carey,
2005). As such, the ‘autonomy’ of art, its separateness from the
everyday realm of utility and necessity, has been closely linked to the
aesthetic ideology of the bourgeoisie (cf. Eagleton, 1990). 
1.3.2 Separation of cultural production and
consumption
At the same time, the moment of composition and the moment of
consumption became separated in time and space, and both acts
themselves dispersed across different social times and spaces. Thus
one aspect of this ‘autonomy’ was that artists (and this category
gained common currency across the 18th century) found direct
communication with an audience or a public increasingly opaque.
This was the social context in which artists uncovered a space in
which to develop the intrinsic possibilities of their material to an
extent that marked European art off from that of other great
contemporary cultures. It introduced a concern with formal innovation
into the work of even the most ‘conservative’ of artists - Bach and
Mozart or Watteau and Gainsborough. Each looked to the
development of these formal possibilities in ways that could and did
disrupt communication from time to time. In Beethoven, Delacroix,
Courbet or Flaubert this impulse became more pronounced, reaching
an explicit ideology in avant-garde modernism. Here is the space of
social critique that Adorno invoked. 
This brings us back to the question of commodification. From the
18th century onwards (though some time before that in literature) the
main mediator between artist and public was the market; and it was
a market which extended beyond the local, beyond the national, onto
a European and ‘global’ stage. From this point the work of art
increasingly became a commodity which could generate
unprecedented wealth at the top end. This is something artists both
resisted and exploited; on the one hand it reduced something with
intrinsic, indeed sacred, value to an exchange value; but on the
other, it freed the artist from direct dependence on a patron, giving
them the social and financial space (and incentive) to pursue their
artistic development (cf. Williams, 1981). 
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1.3.3 Art, utility and the market
The supposed 19th century opposition between pure art and the
sordid world of commerce and industry is a cliché that animates much
talk about contemporary arts and cultural industries policy. This
opposition is much more ambiguous when examined in historical
detail. As cultural consumption began to extend from relatively small
circles to those new social groups involved in the mercantilist
expansion of economies and empires (Bayly, 2004), thick layers of
chintz hid the commercial basis of art markets; but its reality was a
fact of life for any aspiring artist, musician or writer. By the middle of
the 19th century, with industrialisation in full spate, this growing
cultural commodification, as Adorno indicates, provoked a resistance
in the form of a range of artistic and (to use an anachronistic term)
‘lifestyle’ strategies. The former would include ‘arts for arts sake’, a
radical engagement with left wing politics, or a more ambiguous stroll
through the dark side of modernity; the latter might produce the
aesthete, the ‘man of the people’, the bohemian or the flaneur.  
But the art-market nexus is much more complex than the art-utility
separation allows. The account of Pierre Bourdieu (1996) portrays a
complex structure of state and party political organisations,
educational institutions and academies, private publishing houses and
galleries, philanthropists, subscribers, the press, salons, journals,
bohemian cafes, theatres, and concert halls – the whole panoply of
that ‘public sphere’ across which artistic value was created and
realised. The production of cultural commodities was not simply
organised around volume sales (‘the market’) but on a complex and
volatile validation through the intricate play of fine art academies,
journals and opposing salons. 
1.3.4 Cultural policy against the market
Adorno’s notion of the Culture Industry went in parallel with an
emergent post-war cultural policy discourse which attempted to
intervene against the market in order to secure culture from the
miasma of commerciality. This was not simply a case of what we now
call ‘market failure’, where the State steps in to do what the market
cannot; it was a positive intervention to reduce or regulate the role of
the market in that public sphere through which cultural valuation and
validation took place. In doing so it reduced the ‘institutional field’
across which culture circulated to an opposition of ‘market’ and
‘cultural’ value - cultural policy springing to the defence of the latter in
the face of the former. The ways in which, for example, the Arts
Council of Great Britain drew lines between what should and should
not be funded based around the extent of commercialisation present
is well documented (Hewison, 1997; Lewis, 1991). This should not be
interpreted simply as the acquisition by elite taste groups of the public
funding mechanism (though it certainly was this) but also of a wider
renegotiation of the relationship between the State and culture. 
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The roots of this are deep, going back to early modernity. But the
‘civilising process’ of the 19th century is increasingly linked to the
legitimation of the Nation-State in mass democracy – the invention of
tradition, the promotion of national heritage sites, archives, museums
and a musical and literary canon (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983;
Anderson, 1983). But there is also a strong social-democratic
element to be found emerging in the 1920s and 1930s (expressed in
more forthright terms in the Soviet Union) and emerging with great
vigour after 1945, when the masses were to be given access to their
birthright, and the inherited culture of the nation and humanity, which
as a whole had been previously restricted by a lack of education and
leisure, as well as by the private property rights of the rich and the
disgraced (in mainland Europe at least) aristocracy. The
nationalisation of culture thus entailed an element of democratic
collectivisation.  
1.4 The masses and industrial culture
As we noted above, the roots of post-war cultural policy are long,
going back to strong traditions of the transformative power of the
arts, while also having a more prosaic role in the civilisation of the
masses. Accompanying the building of galleries and museums in
London, Leeds and Manchester, in Marseilles and Lille, in Boston
and St Louis and in cities across the face of the industrialising world
were grandiose claims about the historical mission of these new
urban civilisations - the New Athens, the New Florence etc. (Hunt,
2004). Along with these came the more pragmatic claim that only in
this way could the dangerous classes be brought out of ignorance
and anarchy.  The other side, of course, was a fear of the dilution of
this culture as it was spread across a semi-literate mass. This was a
classic ambiguity played out across a range of optimistic and
pessimistic approaches to the forthcoming ‘rise of the masses’.
The turn of the twentieth century saw mass education along with
growing spending power and disposable leisure time combine with a
range of technological and business innovations to produce a new
wave of cultural production and consumption. As Adorno notes this
growing commercialisation affected not just ‘middle brow’ or working
class culture; much of this new consumption took its model precisely
from high art. Film looked to theatre (and the piano players to the
Great Masters), popular music to opera and the symphony concert,
‘pulp’ writing to the great literary stylists, photography to fine art and
so on (Frith, 1998). But equally, ‘high art’ also was drawn into the
new dynamics of commercial culture. For example, the recorded
music industry transformed the field of classical music (indeed
helped coin the term). It made stars out of Caruso, Chaliapin,
Toscanini and composers such as Stravinsky. It restructured
orchestral playing and singing styles; and opened up new
possibilities of home and private listening (Eisenberg, 2005). Similar
arguments could be made about cinema and the theatre (including
opera and ballet). 
More conservative critics such as T. S. Eliot or D.H. Lawrence saw
the masses as impervious, even antithetical to culture – and John
Carey (1992) has traced such views. Others were more concerned
about the impact of new forms of culture on traditional left wing
culture. Edmund Wilson’s ending in 1940 of his To the Finland
Station (2004) pointed the way, where baseball and football took over
from left wing politics, introducing the theme of mass apolitical
consumerism which was to follow in the 1950s. J.B. Priestly (1934)
wrote about the cinema’s impact on the popular imagination, eroding
local cultures, and providing them with dreams with little to do with
their real lives. He saw soullessness at the Nottingham Goose Fair,
where the mechanical rides exhilarated but somehow emptied the
old communal experience of the fair. The impact of ‘American’
commercial culture on both the indigenous ‘folk traditions’ and –
especially in the UK – on older working class communities is a
theme that persisted into the tradition of Richard Hoggart (1957) and
others, forming the basis of an engagement with these themes
through ‘British Cultural Studies’. 
16 Image, right: © Oscar Oldland-Rayner
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2.1 New critiques of culture
Adorno’s account of the Culture Industry resonated with post-war
anxieties about mass, industrial or ‘Americanised’ culture, and the
debates around a cultural policy concerned to protect a European
cultural tradition against these threats. Adorno’s crucial contribution of
a theory of modernist aesthetics and politics, emphasising the
connection between art and society at the level of formal logics and
contradictions, made its way along very different intellectual pathways. 
The rebellions of the ‘counter-culture’ and May ’68 involved a
challenge to established cultural hierarchies. This challenge saw a
rediscovery of the modernist and avant-garde debates of the interwar
period and their concern with politics and form. These radical formal
questions had been outlawed by Nazi and then Soviet ‘realist’
aesthetics. But so too was post-war democratic cultural policy (where
universal access would ensure a common participation in a national,
and sometimes European, heritage) increasingly challenged by the
discovery of a strong radical intent embodied in much of that
modernist/ avant-garde tradition consigned to the outer rooms of the
great European cultural narrative. More generally the Left, faced with
the evident success of capitalism, were drawn to cultural accounts of
its persistence and of newer forms of opposition to it. In this context
Adorno’s Culture Industry, as cultural collapse or as total system, was
subjected to increased scrutiny. On the one hand the Culture Industry
had grown enormously in scope and visibility since his first writing, but
on the other, it was clear that his account of it was simply not
adequate.
In the UK we can find two distinct bodies of work in which Adorno’s
account was interrogated: British Cultural Studies and the political
economy school1. 
2.2 British cultural studies
There is extensive literature on this but we can identify three aspects
or phases which are useful for our theme. First were those community
studies of working class life and traditions which attempted to assert
their cultural validity in the face of the more dominant, ‘official’ culture
(e.g. Hoggart, 1957). This went hand in hand with Raymond Williams’
work on this official culture, trying to both historicise the notion of art
and culture, and to give it a more sociological (and ‘progressive’)
grounding than those official (and conservative) accounts of culture
established by writers such as T.S. Eliot and F.R. Leavis before the
Second World War (Williams, 1958; 1961). 
2  Cultural industries: political   
economy and cultural politics
1 For reasons of space I omit the US based ‘Production of Culture’ school. Cf. Peterson, 1976, 1982, 1990;
DiMaggio, 1977; DiMaggio and Useem, 1978; Becker, 1984; Hesmondhalgh, 2002
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Williams was never naive about the institutional entrenchment of
dominant values and the relationship of symbolic products to these.
The newer groups organised in the Birmingham Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies took this further using theory brought
in from Italy (Gramsci especially) and France (most notably
Althusser). Taking up the challenge of Williams’ ‘culture is ordinary’
they rejected older ideas of commercial ‘mass culture’ being a threat
to a working class ‘way of life’ and saw, in subcultures especially,
new forms of popular culture – around music, leisure spaces,
clothes, consumer objects – not as passive consumption but as
active forms of symbolic resistance to the dominant social order (cf.
Hall, 1976; Gilroy, 1992)
A third phase, from the late 1970s onwards, extended this
examination of symbolic domination and resistance, as Thatcher’s
new conservative agenda began to roll over the political, social and
cultural landscape of Britain. This criticism became more pronounced
as new (post)structuralist tools were brought in to help with the task
of reading/ de-coding popular symbolic products. On the one hand
critics saw an abandonment of real economic analysis in favour of
textual analysis (Garnham, 1990); on the other – and more
worryingly - they felt that this emphasis brought a much more
ambiguous cultural politics. 
2.3 The political economy of culture 
The political economy of culture school was fiercely opposed to the
(over)emphasis on the ideological effects of cultural objects
conceived exclusively as ‘texts’ rather than as commodities. In Britain
the key work was done by Nicholas Garnham, who had worked with
Graham Murdock, James Curran and others to develop a critical
approach to political communication and broadcasting policy
(Garnham, 1990; Curran and Seaton, 1991; Murdoch and Golding,
1974; 1977). In part sparked by their work, from the late 1970s,
Williams also made a significant contribution, attempting to link the
political economy writing with insights from cultural studies (1981). 
The ‘political economy school’ grew out of a more scholarly
engagement with Marx’s work, begun in the 1960s and 1970s, and in
particular those questions of base and superstructure, economy and
culture, capital and state which seemed to have re-emerged with
new force. Previous assertions of a ‘materialist’ basis for art and
culture – that they reflected interests or stages of evolution
elsewhere in the economic base – were seen as far too simplistic.
Garnham (1990) along with Williams (1981) argued that this
‘materialism’ tended to be both too much and not enough. Too
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materialist in the sense that culture was seen to be completely
reducible to the needs of ‘capital’ or the ‘ruling class’; not materialist
enough in the sense that once stated there was no examination of
how this culture got produced, by whom and under what conditions.
The central contention of the political economy school was that
under capitalism culture was increasingly produced as a commodity,
and thus subject to the logic and the contradictions of this system of
production. 
This approach thus identified 4 areas where Adorno’s thesis seemed
lacking.
2.3.1 Cultural use value
Against Adorno’s total system of pre-programmed cultural
commodities, they argued that ‘use value’ had to satisfy some
fundamental human need for meaning or enjoyment. There was a
clear need for new and different products, to see these products as
the work of a creative individual or team, and to feel a certain
authenticity of meaning and enjoyment. There is thus an underlying
tension between exchange and use value at the heart of the cultural
commodity. Cultural commodities are expensive to produce but
cheap to reproduce – the more copies sold the greater the return on
the original investment. But there are limits on this reproduction;
people are not content to consume the same, they want new and
different products. For this reason cultural commodities are prone to
a short shelf life, and income has to be maximised before it hits the
sell-by date.  
2.3.2 Prediction and pre-programming
The second charge was that the prediction and ‘pre-programming’ of
audience response was simply not possible. Indeed, as many writers
stressed, it was often hard to know if a product would sell at all!
Peterson’s (1990) account of the emergence of Rock ‘n’ roll could
stand as a classic example here, but a whole list of examples from
books, films, music and broadcasting illustrated the volatility and
unpredictability of demand for cultural products. Taken together, the
need for new and appealing product coupled with the unpredictability
of demand meant that the Culture Industry was faced with a difficult
business model – though whether this is a difficult business
problematic (Caves, 2000) or a fundamental contradiction (Ryan,
1992) is a matter of debate.
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2.3.3 Multiple culture industries 
The third charge against Adorno was that his totalising concept of the
Culture Industry failed to register the distinctions between the
different kinds of cultural commodities that were derived from the
mechanism whereby exchange value was collected. Miege (1979;
1987; 1989) was most systematic in his taxonomies. In general there
were three different models of realising exchange value. First,
physical objects carrying cultural content were sold as commodities
to individuals – books, records, videos etc. Second, television and
radio broadcasting were (apart from what was then a limited
subscription audience) available free to consumers and made money
out of advertising and sponsorship. Here there were strong
interventions by the State, often taking it completely out of private
ownership and providing it as a public service financed by taxation.
In most States some mix of public service and commercial stations
was in place. Newspapers and magazines occupied an intermediary
position, where individual copies were paid for but advertising
brought in the bulk of the revenue. Thirdly, those forms associated
with public performance – music, theatre, and especially cinema -
depended on restricted viewing and charging an admission fee. As
such the concept of the Culture Industry gave way to that of the
cultural industries, each sub-sector with different ways of realising
exchange value, different ways of managing demand and creative
labour, and different levels of capital investment and corporate
control.
2.3.4 The independent artist
The fourth area of critique was the status of creative labour in the
cultural industries. Given the centrality of the radically free creative
genius to the western art tradition since the 18th century, the
absorption of the artist into the Culture Industry was, as we have
seen, a key index of cultural catastrophe. Though Adorno predicted
this total absorption he recognised that many areas of the Culture
Industry still operated on an artisan basis, with the creators
remaining ‘free’ - if only to starve. The political economy school
argued that this ‘artisan’ basis not only persisted but did not look like
disappearing. There were a number of reasons for this. 
Williams (1981) attempted to give an historical account of the status
of the cultural producer as they moved out of patronage into the
production for market. We moved from direct artisanal production for
the market to a post-artisanal phase in which at first, cultural
products were distributed by a market intermediary. Gradually this
market intermediary became more productive, investing in the
purchase of work for the purpose of profit – and thus it is the
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intermediary rather than the artists who had direct relations with the
market. In the 19th century a more complex process saw the artist
working as market professional, becoming much more directly
involved in the marketing process, and, through copyright and
royalties, gaining a direct share in the profits. The next stage was the
corporate professional, where large cultural producers directly
employed fulltime salaried workers. Williams saw this at its most
extensive in the ‘new media’ sector – cinema, radio, and television –
where high levels of capitalisation and technology are involved. 
2.4 From culture industry to cultural industries
policy
Hesmondhalgh (2002; 2007a; 2007b) underlines the importance of
the change in terminology from ‘culture industry’ to ‘cultural
industries’. It involved a conceptual shift that by the early 1980s had
given rise to a more empirically based understanding of the complex
structure and variable dynamics at work in the production of culture.
It allowed an understanding of the connections between technologies
of production and distribution, changing business models, the
emergent connections between symbolic and informational goods,
and between culture and communications systems. It made more
clear the connections and contradictions between the production and
circulation of culture and the wider ideological needs of the State;
and it focused attention on the ambiguous status of creative labour
within the whole system. But it was not just a research agenda or
critique - it opened up Adorno’s total system to the possibility of a
new kind of cultural politics.
Given the above, it was clear that the cultural industries could no
longer be characterised simply as the ‘other’ to authentic art; and
both needed to be approached in more neutral sociological terms as
the production and circulation of symbolic forms or texts. It also
suggested that the cultural industries themselves could be brought
within the orbit of cultural policy – but how? 
In France for example, renewed US pressure for a de-regulation of
(and access to new markets for) cultural trade in the late 1970s
around the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks,
had met with a new sense that the cultural industries needed to be
protected as part of a national cultural policy. Building on the work of
Miege and others, some in the French Ministry of Culture argued that
as the vast majority of cultural products consumed were produced by
the commercial sector these could not be simply left to fend for
themselves whilst the (minority) arts absorbed all the attention
(Girard, 1982). 
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The experiments in France and elsewhere were part of a wider re-
think of cultural policy – away from the unitary notion of the Nation-
State and its heritage to something more diverse and complex. But it
was also about a more active and democratic involvement in cultural
policy-making and cultural production (Bianchini and Parkinson,
1993). Williams (1981) had noted that technology was becoming
cheaper and more generally available. Electronic sound production
and mixing, cassette recorders, video recorders and cameras,
photocopying, printing, photography – these were transforming the
production and circulation of text, image and sound, with a massive
proliferation of both commodified and non-commodified activity.
These came with a revival of those debates from the 1920s about
the transformative power of technology in the hands of the masses.
This level of activity was increasingly counter-posed to the dead
hand of corporate control. It was a sensibility that had exploded in
Punk and Post-Punk, and the history of the Greater London
Council’s (GLC) cultural industries strategy is unthinkable without it
(Savage, 1992; Reynolds, 2005; Haslam, 2005). 
The GLC’s work between 1979 and 1986 has rightly been credited
with the first cultural industries strategy at a local level but it was
more than this – it was a series of sketches for a contemporary
democratic cultural policy. Bianchini (1987) identified the influence of
Italian cultural policies – the revived Communist Parties trying to
engage the younger, more urban and more radicalised cultures
which had emerged out of the contestations of the 1970s.
Garnham’s 1983 paper for the GLC is often taken as an account of
their activity (Garnham 1990).
The crucial point made by Garnham is that art and the market are
not inimical to each other – the market is a relatively efficient way of
allocating resources and reflecting choice. Public policy can and
should use the market as a way to distribute cultural goods and
services – and to do so in a way that follows audience demand
rather than the ambitions of the producers themselves. Garnham’s
focus was not on local economic production strategy but on
developing a democratic cultural policy based on an educated and
informed audience demand to which publicly owned distribution
companies and cultural producers alike could respond. It was
explicitly not about that support for local cultural producers with which
the GLC is most identified and which he associates with encouraging
a supply for which there is no audience. 
There are three key points here.
First, his emphasis on audience research, efficient marketing and
responding to demand, whilst making an important point about the
responsibilities of publicly funded culture, failed to take any account
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of the processes of innovation, of reinvention, of counter factual
imagination that come precisely from the disjunction between what the
artist wants to produce and what the public wants to receive, or
between the aspirations to the new and the facts of revealed
preference. 
Second, Garnham said access to cultural production is necessarily
restricted if a ‘reserve army of the unemployed’ is to be avoided. It’s
not clear just how this restriction might be effected given the growing
aspirations to active cultural production which the GLC vision
reflected; nor, despite the training for under-represented minorities,
how long standing cultural and economic exclusions from cultural
production might be addressed. 
Third, Garnham’s was a very partial account of the GLC’s cultural
industries strategy –hardly given the time to develop in reality. The
impact on subsequent local economic and cultural strategies was
however very high. It represented an attempt to break out of a cultural
policy centred on the ‘arts’ – and on subsidies to artists and producing
institutions as the foundation of that policy. They began to address the
conditions of the commercial production of culture using economic and
statistical tools (e.g. value-chains, employment mapping), focusing on
how the sector as a whole worked – including those crucial ancillary
and non-creative activities. As such it represented an industrial
approach to cultural policy, using economic means to achieve cultural
(and economic) objectives.
2.5 Cultural policy: politics and aesthetics 
The increasing insertion of cultural industries into a new kind of
democratic cultural policy raises some fundamental issues around
economics and culture, but also culture and politics. The political
economy school tended to look more to the political and ideological
implications of ownership and control, of concentration and monopoly,
of the fraught lines between public and private especially in the
dominant broadcast media sphere. This thrust became increasingly
pronounced as de-regulation strategies grew apace in the 1980s and
90s (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). 
Adorno’s modernist aesthetics saw the space of social critique residing
very much in the formal qualities of the work of art; but such
‘formalism’ was still rather avant-garde in the 1970s. The traditional left
saw the critical function of art residing in its techniques of
representation, of its generating a realist account of the world
(Jameson, 1977). Though never stated directly there is a sense in the
political economy school that this representational function is politically
the most central and within this the word (written and spoken) is
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paramount. Cultural Studies, on the other hand, looked to different
qualities residing in the specific formal and semiotic structures of the
text.
This is not just a difference over modernist formalism, but over a
wider sense of the role of ‘art’ in contemporary society. What was
that space of autonomy whose loss Adorno saw as a catastrophe?
Williams was clear that art was not a ‘sacred’ transhistorical category,
but it did represent a fundamental human need (Williams, 1981). In
its search for an intrinsic value as ‘art’ it represented a site of
contestation with capitalism – not simply as a site of ideological and
political struggle but as a symbolic assertion of an ‘authentic’
meaning as part of everyday, ordinary culture. 
This forms a part with that ‘artistic’ or ‘cultural’ opposition to
capitalism out of which the modernist tradition grew (and which is
central to Adorno and other exemplars of ‘western Marxism’). The
rediscovery of this tradition by the post-1968 counter-culture brought
with it a new articulation of anti-capitalist critique around alienation,
restriction of freedom, and the need for authenticity (Boltanski and
Chiapello, 2005) – all given powerful voice by the bohemian and
artistic tradition.
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The abolition of the GLC in 1986 took place against the backdrop of
the removal by the Conservative Government of a number of internal
political oppositions, not least the National Union of Mineworkers
whose strike collapsed in March 1985. The cultural industries policy
agenda did not disappear but moved beyond London to a number of
the other metropolitan authorities and residual bodies which had
been abolished in the same process. These bodies lacked the
profile, ambition and resources (political, financial and intellectual) of
the GLC initiative, which contributed in part to the increased
emphasis on the specific economic dimensions of the cultural
industries agenda. 
3.1 From cultural to local economic policy
In many ways this shift had a pragmatic basis and its elaboration into
a workable body of policy knowledge happened outside academia,
outside national government circles, and usually on the periphery of
local government where economic development agencies, struggling
to come to terms with an expanded agenda and reduced resources,
intersected with the arts funding agencies. Thatcher’s struggle
against the (mainly Labour) local authorities in the 1980s saw a
massive restriction in their powers of planning and local taxation. At
the same time they were being asked to deliver an economic
development agenda based on the belief that manufacturing was
finished and that the only room for manoeuvre was to provide a
business friendly environment and relevant local skills. Economic
development departments were fairly new to British local government
and they struggled to develop an agenda that would work with
national government imperatives and a more local Labour Party
political base. After the national elections of 1987 the large
metropolitan areas transformed their vision for the future around
making this agenda work for their cities. But local economic
development became not just a necessity but also a site in which a
new urban vision was forged; for some this was a betrayal of an
older politics, for others it was an attempt to seize the initiative in a
changing world. In the process ‘culture’, previously seen as a
marginal and mainly decorative or prestige expenditure, began to
move much closer to the centre of policy making as a potential
economic resource. 
The arts sector began to develop arguments about managerial
efficiency and economic benefits in terms of employment, tourism
and image enhancement. John Myerscough (1988) developed a
model for measuring the impact of spending on the arts; not just
direct spending on employment (how many jobs per pound
‘invested’, as the new terminology had it) but attendance at arts
events that generated spending in cafes, restaurants and other local
3  From cultural to creative 
industries
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amenities. Myerscough was able to use a ‘multiplier effect’ which
gave a figure for the additional employment and local spend
generated by public investment in the arts. 
Myerscough’s work foregrounded the local economic impact of the
arts. Local authorities in fact spent significant amounts of money on
the arts, and they too were keen to assert the economic benefits of
this spend. But given the difficult economic circumstances facing the
old industrial towns and cities this spend was now linked with an
agenda of developing new visitor attractions. Visitors would spend
locally and these new facilities would also have an image
enhancement effect: they would announce a new forward looking
image of the city to the wider world. In addition, the development of
new cultural facilities was – following an emergent US model –
increasingly linked to other leisure, retail and office developments.
After museums came the cultural quarters and with that, a discourse
of culture-led urban renaissance still with us (Bianchini and
Parkinson, 1993; Bell and Jayne, 2004; Evans and Foord, 2005).
These kinds of arguments were in the main developed between the
local arts funding agencies and local economic development
agencies through the intermediation of cultural consultants. In this
period ‘arts and cultural policies’ became much more about the
management of the cultural sector as a complex whole, and its
integration with the general strategic vision of the City; it demanded
new analytical tools and knowledge from outside traditional arts
policy making. A new kind of professional was needed to elaborate
this knowledge within local policy fields. This was not available within
academia; it was elaborated at the level of a small community of
cultural consultants, the most well known of which, Comedia, came
directly out of the GLC experience. It was from within this emergent
field also that New Labour’s creative industries policies began to take
shape. Often portrayed as purely opportunist, or indeed philistine
(‘the value of nothing’ etc.) this generation of cultural policy vision in
fact responded to some far reaching transformations in the economic
and cultural landscape which we need to understand. 
3.2 From market to markets
The GLC’s ‘alternative economic strategy’ resonated with a wider
European left wing concern to assert a distinctly new agenda in the
face of both the failures of Soviet-style top down planning, and the
neo-liberal vision of the de-regulation of capital and labour markets at
national and international levels. New left thinking was focused on
public economic and urban interventions which reflected the general
distrust of large scale top-down planning and new kinds of personal
and political aspirations.
In this process the market itself was subjected to re-evaluation. The
analytical tools used to understand value chains in the cultural
industries and where intervention might be most effective had involved
a new engagement with the market mechanism. This was less driven
by Garnham’s overall analysis than by other activists from within
community arts and politics. Charles Landry, a founder of Comedia,
led a team of distinguished writers in What a Way to Run a Railroad
(Landry et al, 1985). This was a harsh critique of the way in which
‘alternative’ community businesses were run. What was often dressed
up as romantic bohemian idealism was in fact incompetence. There
was no reason, they argued, that arts and community businesses
should not be run professionally and with an understanding of the
market. 
3.3 Fordism, post-fordism and the ‘spatial turn’
In the later 1980s political economists and economic geographers
began to talk of a shift from mass production to ‘flexible specialisation’
and ‘Post-fordism’ (Lash and Urry, 1987; 1994; Scott, 1988; Harvey,
1989; Lipietz, 1992; Amin, 1994). This was an argument about the
increasing fragmentation and volatility of consumer markets.
Predictable patterns of mass consumption had given way to smaller
niche markets and the proliferation of goods and services which had a
higher ‘symbolic’ content and could appeal to new ways of
constructing social identity away from the ‘mainstream’. Responses to
these new consumer markets demanded faster and more detailed
flows of information back to the producer and an ability to respond to
quickly changing demand through a more flexible production process. 
A crucial outcome of this in the developed Western countries was the
growth of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This was
accompanied by a focus on regions with strong SME networks. Like
markets these networks were place specific and grew out of
established social and cultural traditions (Granovetter, 1973; 1983;
1985; Markusen, 1996). In opposition to the abstracting categories of
modernist economic geography, the late 1980s saw an increased
emphasis on social space as a crucial factor in economic
understanding - an emphasis which ran in close parallel to the
‘cultural turn’ in this and indeed many other social scientific disciplines
(Soja, 1989; Crang, 1997). In terms of an emerging cultural industries
policy field we can see three consequences of this approach. 
First, the ‘spatial turn’ moved away from the unified national economic
space of modernity towards more fluid and multi-layered spatial levels.
This in itself reflected the increased awareness of a new dynamic, and
the intensity of global (and this itself was a new kind of scale) mobility
– of capital, people, knowledge and things. Manuel Castells’ hugely
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influential book The Rise of the Network Society (1996) pointed to a
new global scale of exchanges built around interlocking networks. 
Second, the emphasis on spatial proximity and local SME networks
suggested that not all economic transactions are based on
immediate, ‘rational’ calculations of profit and loss. ‘Clustering’
produced a range of economic benefits – pools of common
knowledge and skills, flexible human resources, relations of trust and
a sense of common goals - which were a shared effect of these
networks themselves and acted as ‘untraded externalities’ (Porter,
1998a; 1998b; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Gordon and McCann,
2000; Martin and Sunley, 2003; Wolff and Gertler, 2004).
Third, these ‘untraded externalities’, bonds of trust and common
goals were complemented by shared local knowledge which was
rooted in local social structures, institutions and cultures. Local
companies participated in the production and exploitation of this
knowledge which was mostly tacit – it gave competitive advantage
because it could not be easily transferred or replicated outside of
these local conditions (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Maskell, 2001;
Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004; Gertler, 2003).
3.4 The rise of small and medium sized
enterprises 
This new attitude to markets, a more fluid economic and social space
along with recognition of locally embedded clusters and SME
networks, and of the specific social, political and cultural context in
which they operated had very obvious implications for the cultural
industries. One element that the ‘cultural industries’ perspective
shared with that of Adorno was the focus on the large corporations
involved in cultural production and distribution who, if not coterminous
with the whole of cultural production, certainly seemed to occupy its
commanding heights. Whilst freelancers and independent businesses
persisted even at the heart of the corporate sector they were an
artisanal survival related to older, less capitalised cultural forms; or
linked to State subsidy; or kept on as a form of (self-) exploitation
through flexible contracts, a reserve army of labour keeping wages
low and payment through royalties rather than for actual work done.
However, it was becoming clear that freelancers and small, often
micro-businesses were an extremely significant part of overall
employment in the sector – and were growing fast (O’Brien and Feist,
1995; 1997; Pratt, 1997; O’Connor, 1999; Creigh-Tyte and Thomas,
2001).
The schematic outline of the local value chain – pioneered for the
cultural industries by the GLC and extended throughout the UK by
Comedia and other consultancies (now joined by a few academics) –
formed the basis of increasingly detailed mapping. Such mapping
exercises suggested four things. First, that the different sub-sectors
(music, performance, visual art, TV etc.) were highly networked at the
local level and that they operated somehow as ‘clusters’. Second,
these clusters were generally centred on the larger metropolitan
areas, acting as the locus for urban networks and as service hubs for
more dispersed sectors (such as crafts or manufacture), suggesting
that the City or urbanity itself offered something crucial to the cultural
industries sector. Third, that the line between commercial and
subsidised sectors, between primarily economic and primarily cultural
activities, or indeed between motives of ‘art’ and motives of profit was
by no means clear cut at this local level. 
Finally, one of the key consequences of this growth in mapping work
was the creation of the cultural industries as an object of policy. In the
1970s the cultural industries had been taken into cultural policy at
national level (or by agencies such as UNESCO which aimed to
defend threatened national cultures). From the GLC period on, it
became an essential component of all local cultural strategies,
codified as such in the UK after the creation of the Department of
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1997. As a consequence, one
key objective of cultural industries policies in the late 1990s was to
get the sector to recognise itself precisely as a sector. 
3.5 Culture and economics
The emergence of the cultural industries as a viable policy object
needs to be understood against a larger backdrop of a new narrative
of the breaking down of boundaries between economics and culture.
For many, especially in the arts sector, this was a benign narrative of
a misplaced alliance, one in which both sides could now recognise
the values they had so long missed in the other. Organisations such
as Arts and Business, established to try and maximise business
investment in the arts sector at a time of savage public funding cuts,
were not alone in making the case that these two could be natural
allies not sworn enemies. 
In a crucial intervention the Marxist geographer David Harvey (1989)
surveyed the whole postmodern scene in the late 1980s and linked
this with the discussions about post-fordism, flexible specialisation,
globalisation and the collapse of the post-war socio-political
settlement. A new economic and social order was emerging
organised around consumer markets for symbolic goods in turn
related to new forms of social distinction and identity. This was
capital’s ‘cultural fix’. Harvey saw this ‘cultural fix’ working particularly
at the level of the City, where spectacles, festivals, shopping
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experiences and ethnic quarters had transformed the derelict
industrial cities of the developed world into centres of up-market
cultural consumption.
Lash and Urry (1994) stressed more the role of symbolic
consumption and ‘aesthetic reflexivity’ as central to the process of
identity construction. There was great (self) awareness and
investment in such symbolic consumption and this had a profound
effect on the organisation of production and circulation. To Castells’
flows of people, money, goods and information was added a vast
range of symbolic objects – texts, images, sounds, and experiences.
More crucially, it changed the position of the cultural industries vis-à-
vis the rest of the economy. We saw above that the specific nature of
the cultural commodity presented a number of problems for the
realisation of profit; whether fundamental contradiction between use
and exchange value, or a difficult business model. But the growth of
symbolic consumption meant that the tensions and difficulties of
producing for such a market had become central to many different
businesses. As a result, the cultural industries were no longer seen
as a strange remnant of an older production system but became the
cutting edge, a template for the others to follow into a new economy
of ‘signs and space’. (Lash, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1994). 
3.6 New work cultures
For Lash and Urry (1994) the vertical disintegration of the big
corporate structures to be found in the mainstream economy were
accelerated within the cultural industries. It was not simply that
sectors such as television, music, design, film etc. were increasingly
organised around clusters of SMEs and freelancers but that notions
of aesthetic reflexivity and, in this sense, a more intuitive
engagement with the eddies and tugs of cultural currents, came into
play as a central part of business operations. Cultural workers were
no longer to be characterised as creatives crushed by the wheels of
a corporate sector whose values they resisted as best they could; it
was precisely these people who were in possession of the means to
operate most effectively.
First, was the idea of creativity as a crucial resource for
contemporary economic development and indeed, personal growth.
The literature on creativity is large so I will point to what I consider to
be its salient points only here (Negus and Pickering, 2004; Banaji et
al, 2007). First, it relates to innovation, increasingly seen as the key
to economic competitiveness. It tries to isolate the qualities that give
rise to new thinking, new visions upon which innovation can build.
‘Inventiveness’ had of course been a quality long established; what
creativity does is to draw on an artistic quality, something deemed to
be intuitive rather than calculative. Second, it also draws on a
specifically modernist notion of this – the shock of the new, the
disruptive, the counter-intuitive, the rebellious and the risk-taker.
These are qualities to be found only sparingly in most traditional
notions of art: skill, craftsmanship, balance, harmony, the golden
mean, the middle way – all are qualities which tend to be excluded
from this new use of creativity (O’Connor, 2006b). This borrowing
from an artistic discourse can be traced back through the changing
management literature of the 1970s and 1980s (Kelly, 1998; Du Gay,
1996; 1997; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Bilton, 2007). Third,
creativity has been linked to changes in the construction of social
values since the 1960s – echoing the shift traced by Beck (1992) -
from a sense of social duty and finding one’s place to one of
uncovering the self, and of expressing the self. ‘Letting it all out’ was
also a process of self-discovery and it drew on the values of the
bohemian and artistic traditions associated with modernism since the
19th century (Martin, 1981; Wilson, 2000; Lloyd, 2006). By the 1990s
‘creativity’ had emerged as a prime contemporary value, and a
resource to be mobilised by business (Leadbeater, 1999; Rifkin,
2000; Howkins, 2001; Tepper, 2002).
The second intersection was with the notion of the enterprising self,
again a huge topic (Heelas and Morris, 1992; Heelas, 2002). This of
course was a key image promoted by Thatcher’s attempt to re-
introduce ‘Victorian values’ - with the ‘self-made man’, small
businesses and the spirit of enterprise as its backbone. But as with
many initiatives by Thatcher it was taken up by those who did not
necessarily share her values. The ‘enterprising self’ chimed not just
with small corner shops in Grantham but – as we have seen with
respect to the re-evaluation of the market – with many who had been
marked by the counter-culture’s rejection of the ‘organisation man’
and the public and private bureaucracies of the post-war period.
Against this they asserted a do-it-yourself, work-for-yourself attitude
that represented a powerful feeling of liberation (Boltanski and
Chiapello, 2005).
The third intersection was with those accounts of the ‘culturalisation
of the economy’, which stressed the centrality of culture in
organisational change (Du Gay and Pryke, 2002). Responding to the
challenges of the new economy meant not just abandoning the
organisational structures of Fordism; it required a new organisational
culture. Indeed, it was felt that without a culture change involving all
the workers, a company could not flexibly compete and respond to
economic changes. The cultural industries represented a classic
case, where employees were expected to participate in the ethos of
the company and its goals, giving rise to the new management style
identified by Andrew Ross (2003) in No Collar. 
32 Image, right: © Sam Friedrich/Acumen Images

34
4.1 The rediscovery of the city
We saw above how academic writing around regional clusters and
embedded networks had been taken up in the emergent policy
discourse around cultural industries and local economic development,
suggesting close connections between the clustering of cultural
industries and urbanity itself. 
These connections were an intrinsic part of that ‘rediscovery’ of the
City which took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The ‘network society’
was predicated on the growth of key nodal points which controlled
and directed global flows (Castells, 1996). Cities were now the new
economic powerhouses built on the ability to process knowledge and
manipulate symbols. A literature on global or world cities followed,
marking the re-emergence of the usual suspects – New York, London,
Paris, Los Angeles, Hong Kong – plus a few new ones and leaving
space for a range of second and third tier cities plugged into the new
global infrastructure of flows (Sassen, 1991). 
These different currents flowed together to generate a current of
reform and transformation of city life. This certainly applies to those
developing a cultural industries policy discourse; most cultural
consultants were deeply concerned with ‘the art of city making’
(Landry, 2000; 2006) and involved in projects around cultural venues
and quarters, street markets, alternative retail, new forms of public art
and signage, urban landscaping, architectural and larger scale
regeneration projects, and campaigns such as the ‘24 hour city’. This
represented a coalition for urban transformation that drew on a
European tradition rather than the real-estate driven model coming
from the US (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993). It stressed public space
– in its widest sense – and how urban design as democratic planning
and contemporary aesthetics might provide the basis for a new
popular urban vision. It looked to Barcelona rather than Boston,
Montpellier rather than Philadelphia. From our point of view however it
needs to be emphasised that the cultural industries themselves were
also part of this (very loose) urban coalition and their links to the City
are not just economic but cultural – and to an extent not frequently
recognised - ethical and political. 
The connections between small-scale cultural producers and the City
were first made in two books trying to make sense of the urban scene
of the 1970s. Raban’s Soft City (1974), identified a new metropolitan
middle class who had broken with the consumption patterns of
established class cultures and introduced a dizzying array of styles
and symbolic identifiers which suggested to the author the mystifying
complexities of Mayhew’s London2. But unlike Mayhew’s account of
the lower depths of the 19th century poor these puzzling new patterns
were to be found in the realm of consumption rather than production. 
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2 London Labour and the London Poor (1851) is a work of Victorian journalism by Henry Mayhew. In the 1840s
and 1850s he observed, documented and described the state of working people in London for a series of
articles in a newspaper, the Morning Chronicle, that were later compiled into book form
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The other book, Sharon Zukin’s Loft Living, published in 1982 but
very much concerned with events in the 1970s, took this production
of urban life into a new kind of urban dynamic in which culture
generated economic values recouped, in the main, by the real
estate, retail and leisure industries. The story of how artists in SoHo
won their battle against the developers – who wanted to knock down
this old industrial area and destroy the lofts which had become home
to many of New York’s leading artists – only then to lose it again as
rental and property values went sky high, is well known. Zukin used
Bourdieu’s (1986) notion of cultural and economic capital to great
effect as she showed how artists had transformed the image, the
atmosphere of SoHo to create a trendy, bohemian urban village feel
which was becoming very popular. 
This scenario of cultural gentrification is now fairly common, although
more often intoned than actually examined. However we want to
interpret these claims, two things at least are clear. First, that ‘culture’
has a direct impact on the value of urban real estate, becoming a
key element of culture-led urban regeneration strategies. This impact
can come from the large flagship developments – an art gallery,
concert hall or museum – and from micro-activities associated with
small scale cultural entrepreneurs and urban activists. Second, that
the urbanity of city life is a crucial resource for all kinds of cultural
activities which move between the commercial and the non-
commercial, the subsidised and the entrepreneurial with great fluidity
(O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; Haslam, 2005; Groth and Corijn,
2005). 
4.2 A new urbanity?
The proliferation of freelancers and micro-businesses in the cultural
industries across the 1980s and 1990s cannot be understood without
some reference to these wider aspects. First, the ideas of breaking
the 9-5, doing it for oneself, charting your own life course, of looking
to express yourself, cannot be put down simply to the ‘enterprise
culture’ per se. Part of it was a taking back of control of cultural
production in the face of corporate control. What Williams had
identified at the end of Culture, where technologies of reproduction
seemed ever more accessible to the everyday person, happened at
the same time as the ‘punk ethos’ precisely stressed the ‘do it
yourself’ impulse (Savage, 1992; O’Connor and Wynne, 1996;
Reynolds, 2005). Its later manifestation in ‘rave culture’ also used
technologies in this way (Redhead, 1990; Collin, 1997; Reynolds,
1998). In different ways they were about contesting established
culture and making the technologies of reproduction work for you.
The take up of Thatcher’s ‘enterprise allowance scheme’ was
famously highest amongst cultural businesses; and ‘Thatcher’s
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children’ were those forced to become entrepreneurs because there
were no other options. Or rather, there were other options and they
chose a cultural one. The third element was about liberation, about
transformation of the city, about taking control of your life through
cultural expression, a value often passed over by political economists
(Haslam, 1999). 
The specific role of the urban milieu in the activities of the cultural
industries became an increasing concern of researchers, consultants
and policy makers in the later 1990s. One seminal work in this
direction was Howard Becker’s Art Worlds (1982). In the tradition of
the production of culture school, it moved away from an artist centred
account of the workings of the New York art scene to include a range
of intermediaries, impresarios, agents, gallery owners, lawyers,
craftspeople, technicians and specialist material suppliers. Becker
(and later, Diana Crane’s The Production of Culture (1992))
attempted the sectoral approach to localised cultural production that
we saw with the GLC and later value-chain analysis. In the later
1990s economic geography (itself undergoing a ‘cultural turn’) began
to link research around networks and clusters, innovative milieu and
the competitive advantage of place to the specific question of the
cultural industries. In so doing they were forced to grapple with the
connections between the cultural qualities of place and their
economic performance. Alfred Marshall’s (1890) notion of the
‘atmosphere’ of a place giving it competitive advantage, translated
usually as locally embedded tacit knowledge, became linked to more
explicitly cultural dimensions when transferred to the field of cultural
industries. Castells and Hall (1994), writing about innovative milieus,
certainly emphasised the rich institutional depth of the City – with
universities, research and development institutions and companies,
government agencies, availability of skills and know-how – but their
focus on ‘technopoles’ and science parks did not directly fit with the
milieus of cultural industries. 
The work of Alan Scott, Andy Pratt and others began to push these
connections. In Scott’s The Cultural Economy of Cities (2000) and
later articles (2001; 2002; 2004; 2006) he attempts to link the
economic geography literature with empirical investigation of the
cultural industries. He calls this ‘cultural commodity production’ which
necessarily involves high levels of human input, organised as
clusters of small companies working on a project basis, where
teams, partnerships and alliances dissolve and re-form constantly (cf.
Bilton, 2007). They rely on dense flows of information, goods and
services, and benefit from economies of scale in skills-sourcing and
know-how. These local clusters involve complex divisions of labour –
driven especially by new ICT developments – all of which work to tie
people to places. Andy Pratt’s investigations of San Francisco and
other ‘cool places’ also work within these ideas (2000; 2002; 2004a;
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2004b; 2004c; 2006). Indeed, researchers within human geography
have begun to provide much needed empirical investigation of
networking and clustering in different locations and sub-sectors of the
cultural industries. 
Others came at this from the perspective of the entrepreneurs
themselves. Work conducted by the Manchester Institute for Popular
Culture (MIPC) (Redhead, 1990; O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; 1998)
presented a more positive interpretation of contemporary urbanism
and the role of cultural entrepreneurs and intermediaries within it
than Zukin (1995). It suggested that the line between ‘cultural’ and
‘economic’ activities in the sector was fluid, not just between the
subsidised and non-subsidised ends of the spectrum but within
cultural entrepreneurs and businesses. The difficult business model
of the cultural industries - one whereby the economic value of any
product was linked to an uncertain future cultural value, and in which
such product ideas had to operate in a collaboration with a number
of other freelancers or small businesses, or indeed with a few very
big businesses – meant that networks helped actors manage the
inherent riskiness of their business (Banks et al 2000; 2006; Raffo et
al 2000; Bilton, 2007). 
4.3 Networking and the innovative milieu 
Networking in the cultural industries has provided a rich research
vein in recent years (Crewe, 1996; Coe, 2000; 2001; Grabher, 2001;
2002; 2004; Wittel, 2001; Ettlinger, 2003; Jeffcutt, 2004; Sturgeon,
2003; Nachum and Keeble, 2003; Neff, 2004; Mossig, 2004; Kong,
2005; Lange, 2005; Johns, 2006). This reflects a much wider
concern with the subject suggesting to some a complete new
organisation and ‘spirit’ of capitalism itself (Boltanski and Chiapello,
2005). In particular it suggests the new forms of self-organisation of
SME networks, and indeed, the replication of networked organisation
within the structures of large, global companies (Amin and Cohendet,
1999; Grabher, 2001; 2004). 
Grabher (2001) sees the cultural industries as organised in two sorts
of networks, those within the global corporation (or group of
companies) and those within localities (the ‘village’) – both are
‘heterarchies’, self-regulating systems that allow not simply learning
or adaptation but future-orientated ‘adaptability’. At the corporate
level, there are instituted forums of debate and communication and a
general aim to break up established understandings and practices. At
the local ‘village’ level it is the communal context of skills,
biographies and cultural orientations, often strongly tied to a sense of
place, which acts as a kind of self-regulating ecosystem, an
extremely adaptive heterarchy. Grabher argues that collaboration in
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projects is often about short-term relationships – in that sense
networks are not necessarily about relations of personal trust – but
that on dissolution they persist as latent networks ready to be re-
activated. He argues further that if projects are about learning this is
remembered not by the individual participants but in the networks
themselves, thus embedded in place (2004). 
Wittel (2001) argued that the loose social ties of the urban cultural
milieu were used by freelancers and businesses as a way of gaining
knowledge and contacts in a quite instrumental manner. Indeed, it
represented a new form of ‘network sociality’ in which ‘catch up’ and
quite rapid exchanges of information was replacing the longer
established connections of a ‘narrative based’ community sociality –
one that built up a common mutual understanding over some time.
But other work suggests that the use (or abuse) of such personal
connections takes place within certain limits set by the culture, or
regulative eco-system of these local networks which work to
establish trust (Kong, 2005). Equally, there are many gradations of
networking and many forms of inclusion/ exclusion which act to
negotiate the personal/ professional ambiguities involved. Banks
(2007) wants to stress that cultural industry networks are embedded
within a local ‘moral economy’ that limits the abuses of network
sociality by reputation and other social sanctions. 
Cultural industries then have to be understood as embedded cultural
and business activities (Gibson, 2003); and they have to negotiate
some rather difficult tensions of culture and economics and personal
and professional life which mainstream business theory and practice
have found difficult to understand. 
There has certainly been increasing emphasis on that indefinable
‘atmosphere’, the buzz, the scene, the genius loci, which make up a
‘creative milieu’ (Hall, 1998; 2000). Research suggested that
freelancers and micro businesses – what Leadbeater and Oakley
(1999) called ‘the independents’ – often began as part of a localised
‘scene’, they were ‘active consumers’, ‘near to the street’, and this
gave them an insider’s knowledge of the volatile and localised logic
of cultural consumption – potentially a highly valued and essential
skill (O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; Crewe and Beaverstock, 1998).
As a result independent producers were able to construct a new
sense of cultural identity and purpose, using the mix of cultural and
commercial knowledge which this new form of cultural production
necessarily involved. The term ’habitus’ describes this mix of
emotional investment and calculation, of creativity and routinisation,
of making money and making meaning, of operating in a volatile,
risky environment, using networks of trust and of information which
has to be learned by these producers. As Leadbeater and Oakley
wrote of these ‘independents’: 
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They thrive on easy access to local, tacit know-how – a style, a
look, a sound – which is not accessible globally. Thus the cultural
industries based on local know-how and skills show how cities can
negotiate a new accommodation with the global market, in which
cultural producers sell into much larger markets but rely on a
distinctive and defensible local bias (1999:14). 
Scott (2004a) also links cultural commodity production strongly to the
City. Cities have those facilities, institutions, embedded knowledge
and practices which are crucial to creative urban milieus; as he puts
it, cities are ‘collectivities of human activity and interest that
continually create streams of public goods that sustain the workings
of the creative field’ (Scott, 2001:3). Cities in fact are urban
ecosystems within which cultural innovation thrives; they are not a
globalising juggernaut but thrive across a range of diverse production
locals. Cultural production and consumption transform the city
through its ‘shopping malls, restaurants and cafés, clubs, theatres,
galleries, boutiques’ (ibid: 7). This ‘revitalisation of the symbolic
content’ of cities draws in city governments, linking these
transformations with ‘ambitious public efforts of urban rehabilitation in
the attempt to enhance local prestige, increase property values and
attract new investments and jobs’ (ibid: 7). 
Here the cultural industry agenda is joined explicitly with that of
culture-led urban regeneration. In some ways it echoes Richard
Florida’s (2002) idea of the ‘creative class’, where an ’agglomeration’
of ‘creative professions’ is deemed to be attracted first and foremost
by the quality of life, tolerance or creative feel of a city. Though thick
with statistics the Florida’s book is marked by an absence of any
empirical investigation into what is, in fact, only very circumstantial
evidence (Healy, 2002b; Peck, 2005; Montgomery, 2005; Nathan,
2005; Markusen, 2006a). But Scott, unlike Florida, is concerned with
cultural production rather than consumption. Nevertheless, the close
connections between culture and urban real estate have begun to
cause real tensions as culture-led urban regeneration drives out
spaces of cultural production.3
3 The role of art and culture in the transformation of urban real estate is the subject of a great many studies,
starting from Zukin’s classic Loft Living (1982) about the art-led gentrification of New York, now quite a widely
recognised phenomenon from Hoxton and Bastille, to Kreutzberg and Silicon Valley. A good account of a
contemporary example can be found in Richard Lloyd’s Neo-Bohemia (2006)
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5.1 New labour, new spirit
In 1997 when New Labour were elected, the Department of National
Heritage became the Department of Culture, Media and Sport
(DCMS). Its new head, Chris Smith - now with ministerial status (i.e.
part of the Cabinet) - had long been associated with New Labour’s
cultural policies, having published a book very much associated with
the party’s new take on this issue (Smith, 1998). This marked a new
status for cultural policy and the cultural industries in particular. The
renaming of these as ‘creative industries’ and the setting up of a
‘creative industries task force’ involving many big names from the
film, music, fashion and games sectors seemed part of the
celebratory optimism and the political hype around ‘Cool Britannia’
that was associated with New Labour. Whilst this was certainly the
case – and they were also caught up in the inevitable backlash
against Blair’s supposed PR-led policy making style – there were
much deeper issues at stake.
The new profile of the DCMS along with the publication of a glossy
‘mapping document’ firmly established the cultural industries as a
legitimate object of policy (DCMS, 1998). Backed by some rather
optimistic statistics of employment and wealth creation, a handy
definition and a list of 13 sub-sectors with clear links to statistical
sources, the document allowed local authorities, development
agencies, arts organisations and consultancies across the UK to
place cultural industry strategies at the heart of local and regional
cultural and economic strategies (DCMS 2000; 2004a). After long
neglect, creative industries were now also linked to national cultural
and economic policy. The smallest and newest department began
talking to the very large and well established Department of Trade
and Industry in a way unthinkable a few years before. The cultural
industries, previously ignored or lumped with ‘the Arts’, were to
become central to a new contemporary image for Britain and high
profile exemplars of the creativity and innovation that were to remake
Britain for the 21st century. Indeed, the Creative Industries Mapping
Document itself became a lead export, as governments and cities in
Europe (especially the new or aspirant EC member countries), in
Latin America and particularly in the Far East saw a new idea for the
dynamic association of culture, economics and a new wave of
modernisation (O’Connor, 2006; Kong, et al, 2006; Wang, 2004).
This was not simply a re-assertion of social justice against the hard
headed economics of Thatcherism, something popular culture
articulated throughout the 1980s to little political effect. During the
1990s these popular oppositional currents were articulating a new
attitude to the market and to entrepreneurialism, one that could link
to a contemporary sense of social justice, ‘authentic’ culture and
economic viability. New Labour built on currents of oppositional
popular culture articulated in the form of the emergent discourse
5  Creative industries
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around cultural industries, creativity and socially responsible
entrepreneurialism (Redhead, 2004). Visions of a new economic
order centred on more fluid patterns of work and career; a life course
demanding more individual responsibility in exchange for autonomy,
an economy based not on cut throat competition but on the more
open collaborations of projects and networks, rewards for individual
creativity and innovation away from the fixed hierarchies of class and
corporation – these were the sort of arguments which meant New
Labour and the cultural industries were natural partners. The sort of
economic and cultural conjunction made in the 1980s in France
happened – if in different ways and through different paths – in Britain
in the 1990s.
The embarrassment of ‘Cool Britannia’, taking its place next to
Michael Foot’s donkey jacket in a pantheon of political clichés, was
not simply a PR stunt (and it echoed the earlier experiences of Jack
Lang in the Mitterand Government in France). It represented a
symbolic rapprochement with post-1960s popular culture – with its
transgressions, enthusiasms, rebellions and anti-structures (Martin,
1981). It was a reconciliation with that decade, the ‘sixties’, which
Thatcher had considered the root of Britain’s decline. Now, it was to
be the basis of the country’s future success. 
5.2 Only a name?
The most striking innovation of the new DCMS was a change of
terminology - no longer cultural industries but creative industries. The
shift has led to much debate around definitions, which it is common to
dismiss as ‘one for the academics’. In fact the terminological
confusions and slippages are amongst the most important aspects of
the question because they bring into play a whole range of
correspondences and tensions around the issues of culture,
technology and economics (Hesmondhalgh, 2007a; 2007b).
Chris Smith presented it as a purely pragmatic move in order to get
some key spending plans past the Treasury, where the word ‘culture’
had to be avoided as too reminiscent of ‘the arts’, and thus not about
economics at all (Cunningham, 2002; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt,
2005; Selwood, 2006). Pragmatic or not, the change of terminology
was not neutral; it served to uncouple the ‘creative industries’ from
‘arts and cultural’ policy, yet hoping at the same time to recoup (some
of) the benefits for those very arts and cultural policy agencies.
Crucial to this political trick was the identification of the creative
industries with a ‘new economy’ driven by ‘digital’ technologies and
closely related to the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’ economy. It was the
exploitation of intellectual property rights (IPR)which was seen to
provide the crucial link between these agendas – positioning the
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creative industries at the forefront of economic competitiveness. As
the DCMS definition had it, the creative industries were those ‘which
have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which
have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation
and exploitation of intellectual property’ (DCMS, 1998:3).
This connection to the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge economy’ was at
the heart of the important critique of the DCMS strategy by Garnham
(2005), where he too presented the ‘creative’ shift as pragmatic -
one, indeed, that scooped up ‘software’ employment to make the
statistics look even more impressive to the Treasury. Garnham
pointed to the over-inflated claims for this new economy (something
the ‘dot-com’ boom underlined) and this was a common line of
criticism (cf. Pratt 2005). In particular he argued that the knowledge
or information involved in science and R&D, business-to-business
services and creative industries were very different from each other.
This point was also made by Healy (2002b). He targeted John
Howkin’s (2001) notion of the ‘creative economy’, which included all
those activities covered by intellectual property in some form –
design, trademark, copyright and patents. Healy suggested this
lumps together a whole range of activities and businesses which,
underneath the hype, was not useful and often confusing.
Garnham, building on the central insights of the political economy
school – of which many currently working in the creative industries
field are simply ignorant – suggests also that the new concern with
IP rights is an attempt to overcome one of the key restrictions on
profitability in the cultural industries – the tendency of cultural goods
to become public goods (Garnham, 2005). Strengthened IP
regulations help keep cultural goods as commodities, just as new
rounds of mergers and convergence allows the new media
companies to keep a control over distribution. These raise important
issues for smaller cultural producers, and for the public sphere as a
whole. They certainly underpin a lot of the debates around the BBC
– one of Britain’s undoubted world class cultural companies – which
until recently tended to be debated in a separate sphere to the
creative industries.
I suggested above, that the GLC’s policy had emphasised not the
individual artist but the ‘sector’- the value-chain, the range of creative
and ancillary functions and inputs that make the production of culture
possible. The DCMS definition used ‘creative’ as a quality that could
be exploited by individuals as individuals – or at least those
possessed of ‘individual creativity, skill and talent’. The industrial
sector disappeared into a host of entreprenuerial creatives
generating intellectual property rights. 
The immediate problem was that the DCMS definition simply did not
describe the complex structure of the creative industries sector nor
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the employment and remuneration arrangements of the majority of
those within it. The definition thus encouraged a deeper delusion,
that policies to support and encourage such creative
entrepreneurialism would suffice as an industrial strategy. It became
a small business strategy which, whatever the merits of its particular
implementations, found it difficult to address structural sectoral
questions - value-chains, missing skills and professions, access to
space and technology, development of and entry into new markets,
linkage to the manufacturing/ materials sectors – and more seriously,
to do anything about it when it did identify problems (Pratt, 2005). In
part this was related to the lack of sectoral or sub-sectoral
organisations which could act as representational industry bodies at
policy level (though these are much more common now); but it also
related to the lack of resources given to such an industry strategy
and the absence of any real intelligence about it. The ‘Cultural
Observatories’, set up as part of the new Regional Development
Agencies and Regional Cultural Consortia, around 2002-3, were
massively under-funded and had to service (sometimes with only
one or two employees) the research and intelligence requirements of
the whole cultural sector – which included ‘the arts and culture’,
heritage, libraries, museums and archives, tourism, sport,
entertainment and leisure. 
This emphasis on a universal quality of creativity had two further
consequences. First, it suggested that with a bit of intelligence and
will power any city, town or rural area could look to develop the
creative industries as part of its economic regeneration; as a
universal attribute it was available to all. Yet all the statistics clearly
indicate that the creative industries are concentrated in one very big
(London) and a few smaller metropolitan centres (Oakley, 2004;
2007). Second, if using the word ‘creative’ allows the cultural
industries to link with the wider innovation and competitiveness
agenda, it also brought with it that distinct charge of artistic ‘flair’
strongly associated with popular culture. As we have seen, this was
essential to New Labour’s command of the modernising agenda.
Creativity could thus be mobilised within ‘socially excluded groups’, in
particular ethnic minorities and inner urban areas subject to schemes
for ‘regeneration’. Creative entrepreneurialism provided for an
economic and social agenda delivered through cultural policy. Such
policies ignored real contradictions between the different agendas,
and it was often unclear as to which one it was supposed to be
addressing (Oakley, 2006; 2007; Evans and Shaw, 2004). 
5.3 The specificity of culture
The price paid for the re-branding of the creative industries was a
lack of clarity as to their specificity and distinctiveness. What did they
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do differently to science, or business services, or indeed the service
sector generally; were they part of economic or cultural policy, and
how did those two dimensions relate? Did their distinctiveness
consist in them having a unique and perhaps difficult business
model, or were their inputs and outputs something that went beyond
economic measurement and indicators?
The problem was that it was hard to distinguish between what was
considered ‘creative’ in this sector and in others, such as science,
without some reference to a specific ‘cultural’ even artistic dimension;
but this always tended to undermine its hard edged economic
credentials. Although nodding to the far flung reaches of the creative
economy, the DCMS definition (1998) – unlike Howkins’ (2001) –
results in a fairly conventional list. It includes ‘the arts’, and the
classic cultural industries sector – adding design, fashion and, more
controversially, ‘software’ to these. It set these firmly within a robust
economic agenda with few guidelines as to how exactly this was to
be differentiated from more traditional cultural policy. 
This ambiguous situation provoked some criticism. The first, and
most vocal, concerned the status of ‘the arts’. In part a continuation
of the complaints about bureaucracy, targets, managerialism and
general ‘philistinism’ that began under the Conservatives, it ran into
the new ‘impacts’ agenda set by the DCMS – for social inclusion,
urban regeneration and economic growth (Reeves, 2002; Selwood,
1999, 2002; 2004). Increased funding for the DCMS involved the
delivery of wider social and economic objectives; and many cultural
institutions and individual artists resented the consequent
bureaucracy. But as pragmatic as this may have been it also
reflected an existing commitment by publicly funded cultural
institutions to the efficient use of resources and the effective
engagement with the needs and desires of their publics. 
Part of the debate concerned the techniques and politics of
measurement itself. Selwood (2002; 2004) argued that measurement
tends to be ad hoc and incoherent, possessing little scientific status.
On the other hand, even if done correctly ‘evidence based policy’ is
more about politics than evidence – the latter often simply ignored.
But the problem might lie with the notion of ‘evidence based policy’
itself. Rather than search for indisputable objective impacts ultimately
the question would need addressing at the level of political values
(Oakley, 2006; Oakley et al, 2006). Tessa Jowell’s intervention as
Secretary of State at the DCMS suggested as much (Jowell, 2004).
She did not resist measurement or wider social and economic effects
per se but tried to identify a distinct and relatively autonomous
sphere of activity for ‘culture’. This concern to identify a distinct role
for culture continued in the growing use of the concept of ‘public
value’, which suggested that the different values associated with
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culture could be justified as public values in themselves without
external ‘impacts’, and put forward a public policy framework within
which these could be legitimised (Holden 2004; Keaney, 2006).
The concern with ‘art’, though descending into political point scoring,
did point to its residual value as something beyond the purely
instrumental, a value that remains fundamental within popular culture
also (O’Connor, 2006). Despite the talk of economic and social
agendas it was still the traditional arts institutions which accounted
for the vast majority of national and local government spending in
this sphere (Feist, 2001). Surveys continue to emphasise the
consumption of arts along familiar class lines (Gayo-Cal et al, 2006).
Indeed, we might argue that the continued centrality of ‘the arts’ to
government cultural policy is in contradiction to its claims for the
universality of creativity. 
These reservations about ‘the arts’ are extended to cultural policy as
a whole by those writers at the Queensland University of Technology
(QUT) who have done as much as anyone to give ‘creative
industries’ a theoretical legitimacy (Cunningham, 2002; 2004; Flew,
2002; Hartley, 2005). Hartley invokes the Earl of Shaftesbury as an
exemplar in this respect, using art to civilise the working classes; and
this seems still to be the deep project of cultural policy in his view.
For the QUT group the deregulation of state controlled media, the
proliferating platforms and distribution channels (mobile phones,
internet, satellite etc.), the extension of creative content application to
education, health and information services, and the provision of
‘experiences’ generally – all this meant that cultural policy could no
longer even dream of control. 
Second (a distant echo of Garnham) these new applications and
outlets indicated a market-driven responsiveness to the new citizen-
consumer of the affluent society. The rise of User Generated Content
(UGC), the ‘long tail’ providing extensive consumer choice, and the
more active organisation of consumers through the internet has
further altered the cultural landscape. The market has brought the
exact opposite of cultural catastrophe, and they are much more
sanguine than Garnham about the ability of consumers to circumvent
the control of distribution by the big companies; as evidenced by the
impact of digital downloads on the business models of the biggest
global corporations. 
For Pratt (Pratt 2005) ‘creative’ is far too wide a term and cannot
distinguish between, for example, scientific and cultural innovation.
For Hesmondhalgh (2007b) the term precisely avoids the cultural
dimension, that of the production and circulation of symbolic texts,
the production of social meaning. These definitional questions have
consequences for policy, for in the abandonment of cultural policy
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how are we to attend to the specific requirements of the sector. It
might be that Pratt and Hesmondhalgh’s objections underplay the
proliferation and transformation of the cultural industries which QUT
has tried to articulate. Nevertheless, the positioning of creative
industry policy as a sub-set of economic policy brings its own issues.
5.4 Definitions
Definitions are heuristic devices which implicate the subsequent
handling of the subject, in academic or policy terms. Here I will focus
on five definitions which might illuminate the underlying questions.
5.4.1 David Throsby
David Throsby, coming from a background of arts economics, gives
us a concentric model of the cultural industries.
Core creative arts: Literature; Music; Performing arts; Visual arts.
Other core cultural industries: Film; Museums and libraries.
Wider cultural industries: Heritage services; Publishing; Sound
recording; Television and Radio; Video and computer games
Related industries: Advertising; Architecture; Design; Fashion
(Throsby, 2001; 2007)
Throsby distinguishes the cultural industries in terms of a creativity
more or less synonymous with the creative arts. He ranges them in a
hierarchy ranked on ‘pure’ creativity; at the centre are the ‘arts’ and
on the outside more ‘applied’ creative skills. To some extent this re-
instates the high/ low distinction on the basis of more or less pure
creativity. This purity seems to be tested by the extent of its
commercial application, the arts representing intrinsic rather than
instrumental value. The hierarchy also reflects the extent of public
subsidy, which of course is precisely justified on the ‘market failure’ of
the traditional ‘pure’ art forms. There are many ambiguities here.
Why is literature a ‘core creative art’ and publishing placed in ‘wider
cultural industries’; why are visual arts separate from museums, or
film, or indeed fashion? Why is music core and sound recording not?
The problem here is partly statistical, these clearly being suggested
as a way of counting employment. On the other hand we have a
repeat of that mistake Miege (1987; 1989) identified, where artistic
creation is clearly distinguished from its subsequent reproduction and
commercialisation. This sort of model, which sees ‘the arts’ either as
pure creativity and/or providing the raw material subsequently
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‘commercialised’ by the cultural industries, fails to give an adequate
account of the real processes at work in the sector, and evades
some of the real tensions between creative labour and the conditions
in which it is put to work. 
5.4.2 David Hesmondalgh
Hesmondhalgh (2002) chooses to leave out the arts altogether,
focusing on the ‘classic cultural industries’. The arts are ‘peripheral
cultural industries’ because they engage in semi-industrial or non-
industrial methods. Whilst this might be a pragmatic decision in terms
of the focus of a book, it seems at the very least to set aside a sector
with a very high prestige function, commanding huge levels of public
investment (from education through urban regeneration/re-imaging to
arts funding) and highly commercialised in certain areas
(contemporary art exhibitions; fine art auctions; opera; popular
theatre, music theatre, etc.). It also inevitably suggests a distinction
based on technological reproducibility which does not necessarily
stand up to close scrutiny. The profit model of restricted audience
access in the performing arts also applies to cinema and to live
popular music which is currently a major source of revenue for the
music industry. Literature is part of publishing. The visual arts are
constituted around a complex economy involving large financial
sums. Similarly, we might point to the range of inputs and spillovers
from artistic activity without which it is sometimes hard to conceive of
a creative cluster or innovative milieu. The arts command a degree
of public subsidy, but this does not circulate in a separate space but
overlaps with the complex range of projects involving public and
private, institutions and freelancers which make up a creative
ecosystem. Dispensing with the arts cuts out much that is central to
the cultural industries production system. 
5.4.3 Alan Scott
Alan Scott (2004) avoids some of the problems of taxonomy by
calling the sector ‘cultural commodity production’. However he wants
to introduce some distinction between different kinds of cultural
commodities. He draws on Lawrence and Phillips’ (2002) distinction
between values directly experienced by the consumer (such as
entertainment) and those meant to be experienced by others, such
as jewellery and fashion. (This is a rather odd distinction and hardly
sustainable – what exactly are the different components of
attendance at an opera for example, enjoyment or social display?).
Scott suggests that the cultural-product industries are made up of an
ensemble of sectors falling into two categories. First, service outputs
that focus on entertainment, edification, and information (e.g. motion
pictures, recorded music, print, media, or museums) and second,
manufactured products through which consumers construct
distinctive forms of individuality, self-affirmation, and social display.
These distinctions, whatever their merit, are being used to identify
the different dynamics at work across the sector. In essence it is their
symbolic function which sets them apart and indeed unites a quite
disparate sector. 
5.4.4 The Work Foundation
Recently The Work Foundation (WF) (2007), working with the
DCMS, has proposed a model which draws on Throsby’s concentric
circle model (see also KEA 2006). Fig. 1
At the centre is a ‘creative core’, but this is not defined as ‘the arts’
but includes all forms of original product – popular culture certainly
but also computer programmes. Next are the ‘cultural industries’ –
the ‘classic’ list including film, TV, radio, music industries, computer
games etc. – which attempt to commercialise these creative
products. Finally we have the ‘creative industries’ which include
original product but mix it with a certain functionality – buildings have
to stand up, advertising has to sell, clothes have to be worn, design
has to work. Beyond these are wider parts of the economy which
use creative input – design led- manufacture such as Dyson or
service brands such as Virgin, selling an ‘experience’ which depends
on creative inputs.
Though the WF report still uses ‘creative industries’ in its title, it is an
attempt to avoid the problems of the ‘creative’ tag. First it
distinguishes the ‘creative industries’ from the knowledge economy
as a whole, positioning it as a sub-sector within it. Second, the report
does not use ‘creative’ as the quality distinguishing the particular
products of this sector – creativity as common to all acts of
origination and innovation in science, business etc. – but instead
uses the notion of ‘expressive value’. This value is clearly at its most
undiluted at the creative core, and more mixed with functionality as
we move to the periphery. 
This is certainly a more coherent model than that previously
presented by the DCMS, and it re-inserts the specificity of culture.
Unlike Throsby’s the creative core is not exclusively the domain of
the arts but includes popular culture, computer programmes and
indeed the widest range of original product. The concentric circles
thus do not construct a hierarchy based on pure and applied art –
with the historic baggage of ‘value’ this carries – but simply range
products along a continuum of expressive and functional value.
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Key to this shift is the replacement of ‘creative’ by ‘expressive’ value.
Why expressive rather than symbolic? Maybe the word is somewhat
academic, or sounds rather ‘cultural’ when run past the hard-nosed
DTI people. The WF report defines expressive value as ‘every
dimension which…enlarges cultural meaning and understanding’
(96). It uses Throsby’s list of different values associated with culture
– aesthetic, spiritual, social, historic, symbolic, and authentic. These
are the same terms which John Holden (2004) used to define the
different dimensions of the public value for culture. That is to say,
these ‘expressive’ values - the basis for a range of major industrial
activities - are cultural values, the same cultural values at stake in
contemporary cultural policy. ‘Expressive’ has similarities to ‘creative’
in that it relates to a universal quality residing in the individual, but
makes this more specific to the cultural sector. A clear connection is
being established here between economic and cultural policy; this
cultural policy has real economic impacts – and these impacts are
identified in this as in many other reports – but promotes these
cultural values as valuable and legitimate in themselves, part of
contemporary public culture. To an extent this is a return to the policy
connections sketched by the GLC. 
Fig. 1: From page 5 of the Work Foundation report, Staying ahead: the economic
performance (2007)
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5.4.5 NESTA
There will never be a perfect model, but as a final example we might
point to the model developed in the NESTA (2006: 55) report which
attempts to organise the sector not in terms of the qualities of the
products but, as with the political economy school, the conditions on
which profit is made. This makes more sense of the complex inter-
relations between the different fields of activity. 
Fig. 2: From page 55 of the NESTA report, Creating growth: How the UK can
develop world class creative businesses (2006)
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6.1 Culture and capitalism
This takes us back to the underlying tensions in the cultural industries.
If capitalism is the principle of unlimited accumulation then culture is
always going to be critical; as Williams (1981) argued, it has an
intrinsic value which is distorted when used simply for profit. ‘Critical’
here is not the same as being politically opposed; nor is ‘intrinsic’
about some universal, inherent quality of art. Cultural value is about
something other than accumulation of profit and thus sets a limit to it.
As I argued at the beginning, culture has long been caught up in
commodity production, in the market. But this does not mean that
culture acquiesces to the principle of unlimited accumulation;
Shakespeare was an entrepreneur certainly, but that does not mean
there is no conflict between the values of culture and the values of
profit.
If culture sets a certain limit on capitalism’s drive to accumulation then
there are always going to be difficulties in making cultural policy in
conjunction with economic policy. The conflicts are inevitable. Hence
there is a certain naivety in thinking that adequate intelligence can
manage a complex creative cluster. In fact this only works if a certain
set of values are being shared. This is what gives the UK situation a
particular colouration, as opposed to Germany, or Canada, or China. 
Traditionally cultural policy has been about de-commodification,
identifying certain cultural goods as having public value and thus
provided for by state subsidy. The cultural industries agenda made a
break with this in trying to pursue a cultural policy through industrial
intervention. 
6.2 Employment issues
The new forms of (self) exploitation by ‘creatives’ raise another clear
tension. Research looking at the nature of creative work involves a
difficult set of working conditions, long hours for little or no money, or
to the de-unionised, individualised responsibility for work, pensions,
unemployment and health benefits; or the unequal power relations
when it comes to negotiating IP rights on which they are supposed to
thrive; or the constant struggle against de-skilling, usually in the face
of new technologies (Ross, 2003; McRobbie, 2002; Bilton, 2007;
Banks, 2007). Some see this supposed autonomy as a trick, the myth
of free labour (Garnham, 1990; McRobbie, 2002). But others point to
the pleasures and satisfactions of such work, as well as a
commitment to the product and the process of creation. As Mark
Banks makes clear, such creative satisfactions also come with ethical
considerations; the ‘moral economy’ of creative work is one which –
as with other areas of work – sets some real limits to economic logics
of accumulation (Banks, 2007).
6  Final thoughts
6.3 Cultural policy as regulation and social
control
The QUT group characterise cultural policy as a form of regulation
and social control. To some extent this is true; but as Tony Bennett
(1998) argues, such regulation and control is also productive, and
not simply repressive, as Hartley suggests (2005). In particular
cultural policy has an evolving role in the assertion of public value.
This is of course wrapped up in power and social distinction; but over
the course of the last 40 years cultural policy has moved beyond a
concern with the arts, just as it is no longer about de-
commodification. As the experience with the BBC illustrates,
contemporary cultural policy concerns a complex set of issues at the
intersection of culture and economics (Hesmondhalgh, 2005; 2007a).
And to ignore this, or to argue for a purely economic policy as the
QUT group often do is rather contradictory for both cultural and
economic reasons. A cultural industries policy is about both; it is not
about controlling content but about providing the space in which
content that we value might still be produced - hopefully with a
beneficial economic outcome. Not having an explicit cultural policy, is
of course, also a cultural policy, as is quite clear in the US.
6.4 Creativity 
Creativity has become a key value here, emblematic of what we
aspire to, and what animates the new economy. Cultural industry
policy is central to this and has thrived within it. There is in part a
reservation or second thought – we are the economic future but we
have values that are not entirely those of ‘business’. Sometimes this
is portrayed as itself a business decision, the refusal of the easy
buck a route to future credibility and prosperity. This often hides a
deeper refusal, but one that it finds hard to articulate. For the wider
artistic critique of capitalism has been wrong-footed. The figure of the
rebel, the creative maverick, the desire for autonomy and personal
satisfaction – all these now are central to what capitalism is offering. 
But maybe creativity is the problem. As we suggested, the creativity
mobilised in the new spirit of capitalism is one based on a particular
modernist artistic tradition, of rule-breaking innovation, of the shock
of the new. Maybe creativity has stripped out certain values
associated with ‘artistic practice’ – innovation, inspiration, intuition,
rule-breaking etc. – in a way that leaves a scarred landscape of
discarded artistic practices, poisoning the well springs of the culture
whence they sprung. The older traditions of the ‘golden mean’, the
Chinese ‘middle way’, balance and harmony; the idea of a life spent
in the acquisition of a difficult singular expertise, the artistic sacrifice
of other routes, other skills, in order to master one; the gradual
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abandonment of self-expression in favour of other formal languages
and meanings – all these appear archaic, irrelevant to the incessant
innovation drive of creativity. Richard Sennett has also written
recently about the constant erosion of craft skills and other forms of
long acquired embodied knowledge (Sennett, 2006). In particular we
might look to the ecological challenge to accumulation, which sees
constant innovation as a form of waste – to what extent is cultural
innovation, at unprecedented and accelerating speed, constantly
searching through past, marginal, indigenous and experimental
cultures alike for the next big hit. We might also look at the new
relations between the discourse of creativity and expression and
those older ones of social justice which became uncoupled from
each other in the 1980s and 1990s. Might not certain aspects of the
unlimited right to creativity not cut against other forms of rights, of
social justice? 
This might demand one of those seemingly perverse refusals of the
obvious and the desirable, like Schoenberg’s self-exile from the
delightful garden of aesthetics, or those of the many unpopular
cultures that have marked the following century, or strong currents of
contemporary art (Bourriauld, 2002); a refusal of creativity and its
illusions in a spirit Adorno would recognise.
Image, right: © Oscar Oldland-Rayner
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